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Abstract
With the advance of complex large-scale networks, it is becoming in-
creasingly important to understand how selfish and spatially distributed
individuals will share network resources without centralized coordinations.
In this paper, we introduce the graphical congestion game with weighted
edges (GCGWE) as a general theoretical model to study this problem.
In GCGWE, we view the players as vertices in a weighted graph. The
amount of negative impact (e.g., congestion) caused by two close-by play-
ers to each other is determined by the weight of the edge linking them.
The GCGWE unifies and significantly generalizes several simpler mod-
els considered in the previous literature, and is well suited for model-
ing a wide range of networking scenarios. One good example is to use
the GCGWE to model spectrum sharing in wireless networks, where we
can properly define the edge weights and payoff functions to capture the
rather complicated interference relationship between wireless nodes. By
identifying which GCGWEs possess pure Nash equilibria and the very
desirable finite improvement property, we gain insight into when spatially
distributed wireless nodes will be able to self-organize into a mutually
acceptable resource allocation. We also consider the efficiency of the pure
Nash equilibria, and the computational complexity of finding them.
1 Introduction
Efficient resource sharing is essential in a wide range of systems in economics,
engineering, biology, and sociology. The problem of understanding how individ-
uals share resources in a distributed fashion is therefore scientifically important.
The problem is also important in many practical situations, such as the design
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of communication networks, or the making business decisions like market en-
try. Interestingly, a wide range of distributed resource sharing scenarios can be
modeled by congestion games. The idea is to treat individuals as players in a
game, and they select which resources to use. The payoff that a player receives
from using a resource is given by some decreasing function of that resource’s
congestion level (i.e., the total number of players using it).
Although the original congestion game (e.g., [Rosenthal(1973)]) is rather
general, it includes no notion of space. This makes the game model unsuitable
for modeling situations like spectrum allocation in wireless networks, or market
entry in spatially distributed businesses. To remedy this, [Bilo et al. (2008)] and
[Tekin et al. (2012)] considered the general class of graphical congestion games.
In these models, the players are represented by vertices within an undirected
graph. A player’s congestion level is now the number of his neighbors who
are using the same resource (i.e., only linked players can congest one another).
Similarly as in the original congestion game, the payoff of a player is a decreasing
function of his congestion level.
There are two restrictive assumptions in the graphical congestion games
models studied by [Bilo et al. (2008)] and [Tekin et al. (2012)]. First, the
congestion relationships are binary, in the sense that each pair of players is either
linked (i.e., close enough to congest each other) or not linked (i.e., they never
congest each other). Second, the congestion relationships are symmetric, i.e.,
the amount of congestion that player n causes player m is always equal to the
amount of congestion that m causes n. Such assumptions can be very restrictive
in many scenarios. For example, the interference caused by one wireless user to
the other is a continuous function of the distance between the transmitter and
receiver (rather than being binary), and the amount of negative impact that
two nearby businesses in the same market have on each other may be different.
This motivates us to look at a more general model, i.e., the graphical congestion
game with weighted edges (GCGWE) proposed in this paper.
The GCGWE is a significant generalization of the existing graphical con-
gestion games by considering weighted directed graphical relationship between
players. In GCGWE, the amount of congestion that player n causes player m
(when both players use the same same resource) is represented by a directed
edge pointing from n to m with a weight Sn,m. The congestion level experi-
enced by a player is the sum of the weights of all the edges pointing to it from
other players using the same resource. For example, in Fig. 1, player (node) 2
uses the black resource, and experiences a congestion levee of 4 + 3 = 7 from
players 3 and 4.
The GCGWE is a powerful model, because we can select the edge weights to
accurately reflect a wide range of resource allocation scenarios. For example, the
players could represent business owners, the resources could represent different
kinds of customers ( [Goemans et al. (2004)]), and the weight Sn,m may be a
decreasing function of the distance between the business premises of players n
and m. Similarly, one can model ecosystems ( [Fretwell and Lucas (1969)]) by
mapping organisms to players, and different food sources which the organisms
choose between to resources.
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Figure 1: A example of GCGWE. The players are represented by vertices in a
weighted graph. The color of the vertices represent the resource that the player
uses. The amount of congestion a player incurs is equal to the sum of the weights
of the edges pointing to him from other players using the same resource. For
example, player 2 incurs 3 units of congestion from player 4 (which is also using
the black resource) and 4 units of congestion from player 3, but player 2 incurs
no congestion from player 1 (which is using the white resource instead).
In this paper, we will use wireless spectrum sharing to illustrate the applica-
tion of GCGWEs. Wireless devices communicate through the electromagnetic
spectrum. As the number of wireless devices grows rapidly, it is becoming in-
creasingly important to understand how wireless users can share the spectrum.
Spectrum allocation has been studied extensively from a centralized point of
view (e.g., [Buddhikot and Ryan (2005)]). The complexity of the problem and
the selfish nature of wireless users, however, often make it desirable to achieve
efficient and fair spectrum sharing in a distributed fashion (i.e., allowing users to
select channels for themselves). The spectrum sharing problem has an intrinsic
spatial element, because the mutual interferences generated among users on the
same channel heavily depends on the locations of the corresponding transmit-
ters and receivers. Our GCGWE model allows us to use “weights” to accurately
reflect how much interference one user may cause to an other user. After we
present the general theoretical results, we will show how spectrum sharing can
be modeled accurately using GCGWEs, by choosing the correct payoff functions
and edge weights.
The theoretical study of GCGWEs in this paper is two-fold. First, we want
to understand how the characteristics of player payoff functions and the under-
lying weighted directed graph affect the existence of a game equilibrium. Here
we will focus on examining the pure Nash equilibrium, which is a stable system
state where no player can deviate from the current resource choice and improve
his payoff unilaterally. Such a feature is highly desirable in many real-life re-
source sharing systems. Second, we shall also study the convergence of better
response dynamics, where players asynchronously update their resource choices
to improve their payoffs. This is a typical approach towards congestion game
study, because asynchronous better response updates often make a good ap-
proximation of the behavior of real selfish individuals. With the answers to the
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above two key questions, we will understand how the qualitative features of the
network topology and the payoff functions affect the ability of better response
dynamics to converge to pure Nash equilibria.
Our main results and contributions are summarized as follows:
• We introduce the GCGWE, which is a very general model for resource
allocation amongst spatially distributed individuals (Section 3).
• Our analytical results reveal how the qualitative features of GCGWEs
effect the players abilities to self organize into pure Nash equilibria (Section
4). For some classes of GCGWE, we prove that pure Nash equilibria
always exist (Theorems 1 and 2). For other classes of GCGWE we prove
an even stronger result, i.e., asynchronous better response updates alway
leads to a pure Nash equilibrium (Theorems 3 and 6).
• We conduct extensive simulations to verify and deepen upon our under-
standing about the convergence of GCGWEs to pure Nash equilibria (Sec-
tion 5).
• We show how the GCGWE model can be used to incorporate the real-
istic physical interference model into wireless spectrum sharing. We can
prescribe whether selfish user behaviors in wireless networks can lead to
mutually acceptable and stable system state, based on its network topol-
ogy and payoff functions (Section 6).
2 Related Work
The original congestion game model was first introduced in [Rosenthal(1973)].
The players select resources to use, and a player’s payoff is a function of the
number of players using the same resource. Players may use multiple resources
simultaneously, and the payoffs can be resource-specific (i.e., different resources
may correspond to different payoff functions). However the payoff functions
are not player-specific, and all players are forced have the same payoff function
associated with any particular resource. Every congestion game of this type
has a pure Nash equilibrium. Moreover, congestion games possess the finite
improvement property, which means that better response updating will always
lead to a pure Nash equilibrium in finite number of steps.
The original congestion game has been used to model a wide range of scenar-
ios (together with other dimension of network control such as pricing, e.g., [Ace-
moglu and Ozdaglar (2007),Johari and Tsitsiklis (2003),Ganesh et al. (2007)]),
and this has inspired many generalizations. Congestion games with player-
specific payoff functions were introduced in [Milchtaich(1996)]. In these sys-
tems, different players may have different tastes for the same resource. The
author restricted the discussions on singleton games, where each player uses
exactly one resource at any given time. The author showed that a singleton
congestion game with player-specific payoff functions always has a pure Nash
equilibrium, although there exists such games where better response dynamics
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can cycle and never reach a pure Nash equilibria. Weighted congestion games
( [Ackermann et al. (2009),Fotakis et al. (2002)]) are another generalization of
the original congestion game concept. In these systems the players are associ-
ated with weights, and the congestion level experienced by a player is defined as
the weighted sum of the players using the same resources. Weighted congestion
games may not possess pure a Nash equilibrium, if the players are allowed to
use multiple resources simultaneously. A singleton weighted congestion game al-
ways possesses a pure Nash equilibrium, although the better response updating
is not be guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium.
The graphical congestion game was originally motivated as a game of in-
complete information ( [Bilo et al. (2008)]). More precisely, the graph rep-
resents social knowledge, so that only linked players are aware of each others
resource choices. The early work on graphical congestion games focused upon
a rather limited case where each player has the same linear payoff function
associated with any particular resource. In [Tekin et al. (2012)], we studied
much more general graphical congestion game models, which allow any decreas-
ing player-specific payoff functions. In [Tekin et al. (2012)] and [Southwell
and Huang(2011)], we studied the singleton games on undirected graphs, and
showed that that the games have the finite improvement property when there
are two resources, or when the payoff functions are not resource-specific (e.g.,
resources are homogenous). We showed that, however, there are graphical con-
gestion games with player-specific and resource-specific payoff functions that do
not possess pure Nash equilibria.
Table 1: Properties of Several Congestion Game Models
Representative player- and Spatial Weighted
Game type literature resource- relationships congestions
specific payoffs
Original congestion game [Rosenthal(1973)]
Congestion game with [Milchtaich(1996)] X
player-specific payoff
Weighted congestion game [Fotakis et al. (2002)], X
[Ackermann et al. (2009)]
Congestion game on [Bilo et al. (2008)],
unweighted undirected graph [Tekin et al. (2012)], X X
[Southwell and Huang(2011)]
Congestion game on
weighted directed graph This paper X X X
Table 1 highlights the relationships between the congestion game models in
the literature, and shows how the GCGWE generalizes each of these existing
models. The GCGWE is most closely related to the graphical congestion game
models considered in [Tekin et al. (2012), Southwell and Huang(2011)], which
were also motivated by the wireless spectrum sharing applications. However,
the GCGWE is much general and useful in this regard, because the freedom to
choose the weighted directed edges allows us to accurately model asymmetric re-
lationships between wireless users (see section 6 for details). Such generalization
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creates many new theoretical challenges. For example, establishing the existence
of pure Nash equilibria of GCGWEs with asymmetric congestion relationships
requires completely new techniques. Furthermore, when proving the existence
of the finite improvement property, we can no longer use the arguments from
previous results that rely on the fact that congestion levels have integer values;
we have to replace the arguments with new ones that allow congestion levels
to take arbitrarily small values (since edge weights and congestion levels can
be arbitrarily small in GCGWEs). We will discuss the generalization in more
details in Fig. 4, after we explained the analytical details.
3 The Model
3.1 GCGWE Game Formulation
Let us define a graphical congestion game with weighted edges (GCGWE)
as a 5-tuple
(N ,R, (Rn)n∈N , (frn)n∈N ,r∈Rn , S),
where
• N = {1, 2, ..., N} is the finite set of players.
• R = {1, 2, ..., R} is the finite set of resources.
• Rn ⊆ R is the set of resources available to player n ∈ N .
• frn(x) is the payoff that player n ∈ N gets by using resource r ∈ Rn, and
is a strictly decreasing continuous function of the congestion level x (of
resource r experienced by player n). We will define congestion level more
precisely later on.
• S is an N ×N matrix of non-negative entries. Entry Sn,m measures the
amount of congestion that player n causes to player m when both players
use the same resource. We assume1 that Sn,n = 0 for all n ∈ N .
Matrix S captures the spatial information in the game, and can be translated
into a directed graph D(S) = (N , E). The vertex set of this graph is the
player set N . An edge (n,m) belongs to the directed edge set E if and only if
the corresponding edge weight Sn,m > 0. The graph D(S) describes how players
can cause congestion to one another. Sometimes we refer to a GCGWE with a
spatial matrix S as “a GCGWE on graph D(S)”. The spatial matrix associated
with the graph shown in Fig. 1 is
S =

0 7 0 4
0 0 9 0
0 4 0 0
0 3 1 0
 .
1We make the assumption for notational convenience. We could relax this assumption to
take into account the congestion a player causes to itself, but it seems to be easier just to
modify the payoff functions to achieve this.
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A state X = (X1, ..., XN ) ∈ Πn∈NRn represents that each player n ∈ N
picks a resource Xn in his strategy set Rn. This definition implies that we
are considering singleton games in this paper, which fits into many practical
applications, for example, a wireless user only has one transceiver and can only
access one cellular channel.
The congestion level of player n (when the system is in state X) is∑
m∈N :Xm=Xn Sm,n (or simply
∑
m:Xm=Xn
Sm,n). Graphically, we can think
of the congestion level as the sum of the weights Sm,n of all of the edges of
D(S) that are pointing to n, from players which are using the same resource
as player n. In Fig. 1, the congestion level of the player 2 (which is using
the black resource) is S3,2 + S4,2 = 4 + 3 = 7. Thus player 2’s payoff is
frn
(∑
m∈N :Xm=r Sm,n
)
, i.e., f black2 (7).
We shall begin the analysis by considering the most general form of GCG-
WEs, where the payoff functions are both player-specific (i.e., different players
using the same resource with the same congestion level may receive different
payoffs) and resource-specific (i.e., a player may receive different payoffs from
different resources with the same congestion level). Later we shall will derive
more properties when the payoff functions are not resource-specific.
3.2 Better Responses, Nash Equilibria, and the Finite Im-
provement Property
Consider a system in state X. Assume that a single player n ∈ N changes
its resource choice to r ∈ R, such that the system changes to a new state
(X1, · · · , Xn−1, r,Xn+1, · · · , XN ). We say that such a update is a better re-
sponse update when it increases player n’s payoff.
Definition 1 The event where a player n ∈ N changes its resource choice from
Xn to r ∈ Rn is a better response update if and only if
frn
( ∑
m:Xm=r
Sm,n
)
> fXnn
( ∑
m:Xm=Xn
Sm,n
)
.
Very often we assume that our system evolves over discrete time slots, with
no more than one player updating its resource choice during any given time
slot. This assumption is often used in the analysis of congestion games, and it
is rather realistic when we define the time slot to be small enough such that
simultaneous updating becomes unlikely.
The pure Nash equilibria are the stable resource allocations, from which no
player has any incentive to deviate.
Definition 2 A state X is a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if no player
can perform a better response update, i.e., frn
(∑
m:Xm=r
Sm,n
) ≤ fXnn (∑m:Xm=Xn Sm,n) ,∀n ∈ N , ∀r ∈ Rn.
Definition 3 A GCGWE has the finite improvement property if every suf-
ficiently long sequence of better response updates leads to a pure Nash equilib-
rium.
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Figure 2: A GCGWE with two resources (white and black) on an undirected
graph (i.e., the edges are bidirectionally symmetric), evolving under better re-
sponse updates. In this case, after the player at the top right does a better
response update, and then the player at the bottom left does a better response
update, the system reaches a pure Nash equilibrium where where every player
incurs zero congestion.
When a game with the finite improvement property evolves via asynchronous
better response updates, it is guaranteed to reach a pure Nash equilibrium within
a finite number of time slots (see Fig. 2). Loosely speaking, this means that
greedy behavior always leads to a mutually acceptable resource allocation.
The resources in the GCGWE represent pure strategies that players can
choose during the game. In many games, one may further imagine that players
have the ability to use the so called mixed strategies, where a player can use
different pure strategies with different probabilities. This is beneficial mathe-
matically, as [Nash(1951)] shows that every game with a finite set of players
and strategies (including the GCGWE) has a mixed Nash equilibrium, where
no player can increase his payoff by deviating from his current mixed strategy
choice unilaterally. In our treatment of GCGWEs, we will focus on the study
of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This is because mixed strategies are of-
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Figure 3: The GCGWE that is played on a directed triangle graph (with unit
weights), within which each player can choose from two resources (black and
white) and have homogenous payoff functions frn(x) = −x (for all n ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and r ∈ {black, white}). This game has no pure Nash equilibrium. More
specifically, no matter how the two resources are allocated, there will be some
player (like the circled one above) that wishes to change their resource to avoid
the congestion caused by the player linked to them.
ten difficult to implement in practice ( [Courcoubetis and Weber (2005)]), due
to reasons such as large information burden for the players ( [Fudernberg and
Tirole (1991),Gibbens et al. (2000)]).
4 Results
In this section we shall describe our main analytic results. We shall begin by
discussing some examples of GCGWEs with no pure Nash equilibria. Afterwards
we shall discuss various positive results about types of GCGWE that always
possess pure Nash equilibria or the finite improvement property. The results in
subsection 4.1 are related to the most general type of GCGWEs, which have
player-specific and resource-specific payoff functions. The GCGWEs we discuss
in subsection 4.2 still have player-specific payoff functions, although the payoff
functions are not resource-specific. We summarize our results using Table 2 and
Fig. 4 in subsection 4.3. Full proofs of all results can be found in the appendix.
4.1 GCGWEs with player-specific and resource-specific
payoff functions.
4.1.1 GCGWEs without pure Nash equilibria
It is important to understand what kind of GCGWE do not have pure Nash
equilibria, because it helps us to understand when our positive results can or
cannot be generalized. Also, understanding what qualitative features induce
games with no pure Nash equilibria help us to predict the situations where
spatially distributed individuals cannot organize themselves into a mutually
acceptable resource allocation.
One can construct relatively simple GCGWEs on directed graphs which have
no pure Nash equilibria. An example is shown in Fig. 3. If we replace the edge
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weights in Fig. 3 with any positive real numbers, the new GCGWE still has no
pure Nash equilibrium. More generally, any GCGWE on a directed cycle with
an odd number of vertices will not have a pure Nash equilibrium.
The fact that GCGWEs with no pure Nash equilibria exist is not really a
new result. Our systems are generalizations of the graphical congestion games
considered in [Tekin et al. (2012)]. In [Tekin et al. (2012)], there is an example
of an graphical congestion game on an undirected graph, which has no pure
Nash equilibria. That game has five players, three resources, and player-specific
payoff functions. We can view that example as a GCGWE with a symmetric
boolean spatial matrix. What the example in Fig. 3 shows that, however, a
GCGWE with no pure Nash equilibria can be constructed very easily if one
allows asymmetric spatial matrices. However, Theorems 1 and 2 show that there
are large classes of GCGWEs with asymmetric spatial matrices that always have
pure Nash equilibria.
4.1.2 GCGWE on a Directed Tree
When the players are distantly scattered through space such that the graph of
their congestion relationships forms a tree, a pure Nash equilibrium is guaran-
teed to exist.
Definition 4 A weighted directed graph D is a directed tree if and only if
the undirected graph obtained by disregarding the directions associated with D’s
edges2 is a tree.
A directed tree is depicted in Fig. 4. Every weighted tree with symmetric
links is a directed tree. Also, the star and line network topologies (which are
often used for the analysis of wireless networks, e.g., [Lu et al. (2004),Sikora et
al. (2006)]) are examples of directed trees.
Theorem 1 Every GCGWE that is played upon a directed tree D(S) has a pure
Nash equilibrium.
Proof Sketch: Every directed tree can be constructed by starting with a
single vertex, and then adding extra vertices one at a time in such a way that
every newly added vertex is linked with exactly one pre-existing vertex. When
a new vertex is added to a GCGWE on a directed tree at pure Nash equilib-
rium, the pre-existing vertices can adapt their strategies (taking account of the
newcomers presence) to construct a new pure Nash equilibrium. We can then
use induction to prove the existence of pure Nash equilibria on each directed
tree. See Appendix 8.1 for a full proof. 
4.1.3 GCGWE on a Directed Acyclic Graph
Definition 5 A GCGWE is on a directed acyclic graph when the directed
graph D(S) derived from the games spatial matrix S contains no cycles.
2So n is connected to m by a single undirected edge if and only if (n,m) or (m,n) is an
edge of D.
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Theorem 2 Every GCGWE that is played on a directed acyclic graph D(S)
has a pure Nash equilibrium3.
Proof Sketch: Every directed acyclic graph can be given a topological sort
[Kahn(1962)]. A topological sort is an ordering of the vertices, such that if
i < j then there is no directed edge from the jth vertex to the ith vertex
in the ordering. Let k(u) ∈ N denote the uth vertex/player which appears
in some topological sort of D(S). We can construct a pure Nash equilibrium
of the GCGWE by having players sequentially update their strategies (in the
order of k(1), k(2), k(3), · · · , etc.), so that when a player updates they select
the resource that maximizes their payoff against their neighbors. This leads to
a pure Nash equilibrium. No player will regret their resource choice, because
players updated subsequently will have no influence upon them. See Appendix
8.2 for a full proof. 
We establish this result by recognizing that the resources can be allocated
to individuals in an acyclic graph in such a way that the resource given to a
particular individual has no effect upon the performance of an individual whose
resource is allocated later. This also gives us a polynomial time algorithm for
constructing a pure Nash equilibrium.
4.1.4 GCGWE on an Undirected Graph with Two Resources
Definition 6 We say a GCGWE is on an undirected graph when it has
symmetric spatial matrix S, i.e., Sn,m = Sm,n, for all n,m ∈ N .
The following result identifies a large class of GCGWEs where better re-
sponse updating is guaranteed to converge to pure Nash equilibria.
Theorem 3 Every GCGWE with R = 2 resources on an undirected graph has
the finite improvement property.
Proof Sketch: The dynamics of GCGWEs with two resources on undirected
graphs are equivalent to the dynamics of Hopfield neural networks ( [Hop-
field(1982)]). We exploit this fact by defining a potential function V (X) on
the states X of our game, which is similar to the potential function defined
for Hopfield networks. See the appendix for the definition of V . We show that
whenever the system moves from a state X to a state Y because some player
performs a better response update, we have V (Y ) < V (X). Since the potential
function V decreases with every better response update, our GCGWE cannot
visit the same state more than once as it evolves via asynchronous better re-
sponse updates. The number of states is finite, so the GCGWE must eventually
reach a state from which no better response updates can be performed. Such
a state is a pure Nash equilibrium by definition. See Appendix 8.3 for the full
proof. 
3Note this result even holds when the payoff functions are player-specific and resource-
specific.
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The assumption of having only two resources may seem to be restrictive at
the first glance. However, Theorem 3 has many implications, because it high-
lights a wide range of games (with player-specific and resource-specific payoff
functions) where players can organize themselves into pure Nash equilibria. For
example in marketing, one resource could represent entering a particular market
(which would have some congestion dependent payoff), while the other resource
could represent not entering the market (which would have a payoff function
that is constantly zero4). Similarly in wireless networking, one resource could
represent using a particular channel, while the other represents not using it. In
scenarios where individuals decide whether or not to enter each market (channel)
independently, Theorem 3 implies the existence of pure Nash equilibria.
4.2 Results about GCGWEs with homogenous resources
A GCGWE with homogenous resources is a GCGWE where all resources appear
identical (from any particular player’s perspective), and thus the players’ payoffs
are not resource-specific. There are many congestion scenarios where resources
are homogenous, for example, the assumption that resources (channels) are
homogenous can be quite reasonable for some modern wireless systems (we
shall discuss this more in section 6). Note that we still allow players’ payoff
functions to be player-specific in this section.
Definition 7 A GCGWE has homogenous resources if and only if f1n(x) =
f2n(x) = ... = f
R
n (x), for all n ∈ N and x.
When discussing GCGWEs with homogenous resources, we will often drop
the superscripts in the payoff functions (i.e., writing frn(x) as fn(x)).
A GCGWE becomes significantly easier to understand when resources are
homogenous, because a strategy change will improve a player’s payoff in this
case if and only if that strategy change decreases their congestion level (see
Theorem 4). This fact is highly significant when the GCGWE is played on an
undirected graph (see Theorem 6). When a player in such a GCGWE does a
better response update, they decrease their own congestion level as well as the
average congestion level of their neighbors. In fact, the collective behavior of
the selfish players decrease the total congestion level of the system.
4.2.1 Better response updating is equivalent to decreasing conges-
tion when resources are homogenous
Our next theorem states that when resource are homogenous, “improvement”
(the increase of a player’s payoff) is the same as “decreasing congestion”.
Theorem 4 Consider a GCGWE with homogenous resources, in a state X.
The event where player n changes its resource choice to r ∈ Rn is a better
4Technically speaking we could not include a constantly valued payoff function because our
payoff functions need to be strictly decreasing, however such a function could be approximated
by a function of the form frn(x) = −.x, where  > 0 is sufficiently small.
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response update if and only if it leads to a decrease in n’s congestion level ( i.e.,∑
m:Xm=r
Sm,n <
∑
m:Xm=Xn
Sm,n).
Proof: The event where player n changes their resource choice to r is a bet-
ter response update if and only if fn(
∑
m:Xm=r
Sm,n) > fn(
∑
m:Xm=Xn
Sm,n).
Since fn is a strictly decreasing function, we have fn(
∑
m:Xm=r
Sm,n) > fn(
∑
m:Xm=Xn
Sm,n)
if and only if
∑
m:Xm=r
Sm,n <
∑
m:Xm=Xn
Sm,n. 
Theorem 4 is fundamental and allows us to characterize more properties of
GCGWEs with homogenous resources. Theorem 5 gives us an upper bound on
the amount of congestion a player will incur at a pure Nash equilibrium .
Theorem 5 Suppose we have a GCGWE with homogenous resources at a pure
Nash equilibrium X. Then the congestion level
∑
m:Xm=Xn
Sm,n of any player
n ∈ N is no larger than
(∑N
m=1 Sm,n
)
/|Rn|.
Proof: We will prove the result by contradiction. Suppose to the con-
trary that the game is at a pure Nash equilibrium X with
∑
m:Xm=Xn
Sm,n >(∑N
m=1 Sm,n
)
/|Rn|. Since fn is a strictly decreasing function, and player n
cannot increase their payoff by using any resource r ∈ Rn, Theorem 4 im-
plies that
∑
m:Xm=r
Sm,n ≥
∑
m:Xm=Xn
Sm,n >
(∑N
m=1 Sm,n
)
/|Rn|, ∀r ∈
Rn. By adding all |Rn| inequalities together, we have
∑
r∈Rn
∑
m:Xm=r
≥
|Rn|
∑
m:Xm=Xn
Sm,n >
∑N
m=1 Sm,n. Since
∑N
m=1 Sm,n ≥
∑
r∈Rn
∑
m:Xm=r
,
we then have a contradiction of
∑N
m=1 Sm,n >
∑N
m=1 Sm,n. This proves the
result. 
Theorem 5 essentially says that (at a pure Nash equilibrium) no player will
have a congestion level that is above their maximum possible congestion level
divided by the number of resources that are available to him. This is good
news, because it means that if enough resources are available then all pure
Nash equilibria will be guaranteed to have low levels of congestion.
4.2.2 GCGWEs with homogenous resources on undirected graphs
Now we are in a position to state our central result, Theorem 6, which identifies
a large class of GCGWE’s with homogenous resources which have the finite im-
provement property. This theorem has very important implications for wireless
networks, as we shall discuss in Section 6.
Theorem 6 Every GCGWE with homogenous resources on an undirected graph
has the finite improvement property.
Proof: Let us define the total congestion level of a state X to be the sum
of the congestion levels of all players, i.e., C(X) =
∑N
n=1
∑
m:Xn=Xm
Sm,n.
Suppose we have a GCGWE with homogenous resources and a symmetric spatial
matrix S, that starts in state X. Now suppose some player performs a better
response update, and this converts the game state to Y . This will lead to
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C(Y ) < C(X), as shown in details in Appendix 8.4. To see this intuitively,
note that when a player n performs a better response update, it decreases their
congestion level by some amount (according to Theorem 4). Since the spatial
matrix is symmetric, the sum of the congestion levels of n’s neighbors decreases
by the same amount, hence the total congestion level of the system decreases.
More precisely, suppose n’s better response update involves changing his
resource from r to r′. Now the total congestion level of the neighbors of n who
use r will decrease, by an amount equal to the congestion level of n in state X,
as a result of n’s better response update. Also, the total congestion levels of the
neighbors of n who use r′ will increase, by an amount equal to the congestion
level of n in state Y , as a result of n’s better response update. The congestion
levels of other the players (expect for n himself) will not alter as a result of
n’s better response update. Now since n’s congestion level decreases as a result
of the update, we have that the total congestion levels of n’s neighbors will
decreases as a result of the update. It follows that n’s better response update
will lead to a decrease in the total congestion level of the system.
This implies that our GCGWE cannot visit the same state more than once
when it evolves via asynchronous better response updates (because C(X) de-
creases with every update). Since the number of states is finite, so the GCGWE
must eventually reach a state from which no better response updates can be
performed. Such a state is a pure Nash equilibrium by definition. 
This is an important result, because it states that when the resources are
homogenous and the spatial relationships between the players are symmetric,
the population will be eventually organize itself into a pure Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, Theorem 5 implies that the resulting equilibria will involve relatively
low levels of congestion.
4.2.3 Computational Complexity
We proved Theorem 6 by showing that the total congestion level of all the
players decreases with every better response update. This fact also implies the
following result about the complexity of finding efficient pure Nash equilibria.
Theorem 7 For a GCGWE with homogenous resources on an undirected graph,
it is NP hard to find the pure Nash equilibrium that maximizes the total payoff
of the players among all pure Nash equilibria.
Proof Sketch: For any undirected graph G, one can construct a GCGWE
(with 3 homogenous resources and frn(x) = −x) on G, which has a pure Nash
equilibrium under which the total payoff of the players is non-negative (i.e., the
highest that one can expect) if and only if G can be given a proper coloring,
using 3 colors. Here a proper coloring means an assignment of one color to each
vertex of the graph such that no pair of adjacent vertices share the same color.
Loosely speaking, this means finding the pure Nash equilibrium that maximizes
the total payoff is at least as hard as determining whether a graph can be given a
proper coloring with 3 colors (which is an NP complete problem [Blum (1987)]).
See Appendix 8.5 for the full proof. 
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Theorem 7 implies that in a general GCGWE, the problem of finding the
state which maximizes the total payoff of the players will also be an NP hard
problem. This is true because finding the optimal pure Nash equilibrium of a
generic GCGWE is clearly at least as difficult as finding it within the special
case where resources are homogenous and the graph is undirected.
4.3 Summary of results
Table 2: Summary of results (Note: FIP means finite improvement property)
Network topology Payoff Functions Always have Always have Corresponding part
(Weighted graph type) Player- Resource- pure Nash FIP? in Section 4
specific? specific? equilibria?
General directed No No No No 4.1.1
Directed tree Yes Yes Yes Unknown 4.1.2, Theorem 1
Directed Acyclic Yes Yes Yes Unknown 4.1.3, Theorem 2
General undirected Yes Yes No No 4.1.1
General undirected Yes No Yes Yes 4.1.4, Theorem 6
Undirected with two resources Yes Yes Yes Yes 4.1.4, Theorem 3
The assumptions and assertions of our results about convergence properties
are summarized in Table 2, which shows how different characteristics of the
network topology and the payoff functions imply convergence properties. Our
results show that the original congestion game of [Rosenthal(1973)] can be gen-
eralized a great deal, whilst preserving the finite improvement property or the
existence of pure Nash equilibria. Fig. 4 gives a visual summary of our results,
and shows how they relate to previous results from [Tekin et al. (2012)]. We
derived our positive results about the finite improvement property (i.e., Theo-
rems 3 and 6) by substantially generalizing results in [Tekin et al. (2012)] from
unweighted undirected graphs to weighted undirected graphs. Furthermore, we
derive completely new results on directed graph structures (Theorems 1 and 2).
5 Simulations to investigate GCGWE proper-
ties
Our analytic studies focus upon whether various kinds of GCGWEs would con-
verge to pure Nash equilibria via better response updates. To test and expand
our knowledge of this subject, we use simulations to investigate how long it will
take randomly generated GCGWEs (of different kinds) to converge to pure Nash
equilibria under better response updates. In particular, we investigate how the
underlying graph structure, payoff functions, number of players, and number of
resources, affect the convergence time of a GCGWE.
In the simulations, we consider random better response update as follows. We
select a player n to update, which is chosen uniformly at random, from the set
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Figure 4: A Venn diagram showing the relationship between different types of
GCGWEs, previously studied graphical congestion games and our main positive
results. Each circle represents a class of structures, and we picture an example in
each case. Our new results are italicized. The previously known results (which
are from [Tekin et al. (2012)]) are not italicized.
of all players that can perform a better response update. Player n then choose
a new resource uniformly at random from the set of resources which are better
responses for him. In terms of initialization, we will let the GCGWE start with
a state where all players use the resource number one, and perform one random
better response update each time slot. The simulation for one topology will
stop when a pure Nash equilibria has been reached (in which case the number
of time slots equals the convergence time) or until 10000 time slots has elapsed
(in which case we halt the simulation to save computer time, and because a
pure Nash equilibrium may never be reached).
We perform many trials to investigate the convergence properties of our
GCGWEs. Each trial involves generating a random GCGWE by choosing its
payoff functions and spatial matrix S, and then observing how long it will take
for the system to converge to a pure Nash equilibrium under random better
response updates. Suppose we have N players and R resources.
We consider three ways to generate random spatial matrices S:
• Random undirected graph with uniform edge weights: For each i, j ∈
{1, 2, ..., N}, if i < j then we choose Si,j uniformly at random from {0, 1};
if i = j then Si,j = 0; if i > j we set Si,j equal to Sj,i. This method es-
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sentially generates an Erdos-Renyi random graph, where the probability
that any pair of distinct vertices are linked is 1/2.
• Random undirected weighted graph: For each i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, if i < j
then we choose Si,j uniformly at random from the closed unit interval
[0, 1]; if i = j then Si,j = 0; if i > j we set Si,j equal to Sj,i. This method
leads to a symmetric graph whose edges have random weights.
• Random directed weighted graph: For each i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, if i 6= j then
we choose Si,j uniformly at random from the closed unit interval [0, 1]; if
i = j then Si,j = 0. This leads to a directed graph with random edge
weights and may be asymmetric.
We also consider two ways to define the payoff functions:
• Random heterogenous payoff functions: For each player n and each re-
source r, the payoff function frn is a randomly selected decreasing poly-
nomial frn(x) = −(a + bx + cx2 + dx3) with coefficients a, b, c, d selected
uniformly at random from the open unit interval (0, 1).
• Homogenous payoff functions: For each player n and each resource r, the
payoff function frn has the same form f
r
n(x) = 1/x. Under better response
dynamics, any GCGWE with homogenous resources evolves in the same
way as the GCGWE with homogenous payoff functions (that has the same
number of resources and spatial matrix). Recall from Theorem 4 that a
better response update in a GCGWE with resource homogenous GCGWEs
is equivalent of a player reduces its congestion level, and this action does
not depend on the particular form of the payoff function.
5.1 Impact of Graph Structure
Figure 5: A histogram showing the distribution of convergence times generated
by 1000 trials with N = 6 players, R = 3 resources, heterogenous payoff func-
tions and random undirected graphs with uniform edge weights. Convergence
occurred within every instance and the maximum convergence time is 15.
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Figure 6: A histogram showing the distribution of convergence times generated
by 1000 trials with N = 6 players, R = 3 resources, heterogenous payoff func-
tions and random undirected weighted graphs. Convergence occurred within
every instance.
We begin by investigating how the graph structure effects the convergence
dynamics for random GCGWEs. We consider N = 6 players, R = 3 resources,
and heterogenous payoff functions. Under each of the three mechanisms for
randomly generating spatial matrices mentioned above, we perform 1000 trials
and observe how the convergence times of these trials are distributed.
In the first case of random undirected graphs with uniform edge weights,
convergence occurred in each of the 1000 trials that we conducted. Fig. 5 shows
how the systems converge quickly (within 15 time slots) in each case. When we
consider the second case of random undirected weighted graphs, Fig. 6 illustrates
that the convergence times are very similar as that in Fig. 5. Again, convergence
occurred within each of our 1000 trials. However, as we note in subsubsection
4.1.1, it is possible to construct graphs in this category such that there is no
Nash equilibria. The simulation imply that such cases are rare in practice.
When we consider the third case of random directed weighted graphs (i.e.,
asymmetric relationship among players), non-convergent systems become more
common. Even for those that converge, they may take much longer times.
Fig. 7 illustrates this phenomenon, where 997 out of 1000 trials converged within
10000 time slots. We studied the remaining three non-convergent cases in more
details. In two of these three cases, convergence did not occur because pure Nash
equilibria do not exist (meaning that convergence is completely impossible, from
any initial condition). The last case is more interesting, and the system state
transition is shown in Fig. 8. In this case, it is possible for the system to converge
to a pure Nash equilibrium because it does exist, and we can find such paths
that lead to a pure Nash equilibrium. However, our random better response
updates were stuck in a recurrent part of the state space (the purple part) and
thus did not converge. To put it more whimsically, the system had a chance to
get to a pure Nash equilibrium, but it was unlucky, and ended up falling into
an inescapable hole.
In addition to the fact that convergence is not guaranteed when the spatial
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Figure 7: A histogram showing the distribution of convergence times with N = 6
players, R = 3 resources, heterogenous payoff functions and random directed
weighted graphs. To generate this distribution we performed 1000 trials. Only
997 of these trials converged, and we only used their convergence times to make
this plot. We proved the other 3 trials never converged. This is a long tailed
distribution and so we have given the x-axis and the y-axis logarithmic scales.
matrix is asymmetric, Fig. 7 also reveals that the distribution of convergence
times looks different to the previous cases in Figs. 5 and 6. The distribution in
Fig. 7 is long tailed, meaning that very long convergence times can occur with
non-negligible probabilities. This reveals an intrinsic difficulty with studying
convergence times through simulations. It is possible for a system to take a
very long time to converge, and it is also possible that the system will never
converge. In the systems we study there are only 729 states, and so it is possible
to make a complete picture of the state space and rigorously verify whether pure
Nash equilibria exist and whether they can be reached from the initial condition
(as in Fig. 8). However, in non-convergent simulations involving more resources
and players, it can be very difficult to know whether one has run the system for
long enough, or whether convergence is will never occur.
5.2 Impact of Resources Homogeneity
When the resources are homogenous, convergence is guaranteed in special cases.
In Fig. 9 we show how the convergence times are distributed for random GCG-
WEs with N = 6 players, R = 3 resources, random undirected unweighted
graphs and homogenous payoff functions. Each of the 1000 trials converged.
This agrees with Theorem 6, which implies that these kind of systems will al-
ways converge to a pure Nash equilibrium eventually. Also, Fig. 9 reveals the
pleasing fact that this convergence seems to occur very quickly in practice. The
mean convergence time of these trials was 7.531, which is less than the mean
convergence time of the case where the payoff functions were heterogenous (i.e.,
Fig. 6), which was 8.091.
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Figure 8: A fragment of the state space associated with one of the none conver-
gent simulations encountered in the generation of Fig. 7. Each point represents
a state (a way to associate players with resources), each arrow represents a state
transition that can occur because a player does a better response update. The
large gray node represents the initial condition (where all players are using re-
source 1). The white nodes are the pure Nash equilibria of the system. The
path through the state space the system actually took during the simulation,
is shown by the purple arrows. Note that the state gets trapped in a piece of
the state space which is not a pure Nash equilibrium, and from which it cannot
escape.
5.3 Impact of Numbers of Players and Resources
It is difficult to compare the convergence times of different kinds of GCGWEs
directly. This is because the notion of expected convergence time is undefined
when the system may not converge, and the variance of times taken in conver-
gent systems may be very large (as illustrated in Fig. 7). For these reasons, we
compare different kinds of GCGWEs using the relative frequency of fast conver-
gence. We define this to be the fraction of our 1000 trials which converge to a
pure Nash equilibrium within ten time slots. Fig. 10 we show how the relative
frequency of fast convergence depends upon the number of players. This figure
shows how the relative frequency of fast convergence decreases gradually with
the number of players, and GCGWEs with random undirected weighted graphs
are more likely to converge within ten time slots than GCGWEs with random
directed weighted graphs. In a similar way, Fig. 11 shows how the relative fre-
quency of fast convergence depends upon the number of resources (when the
number of players is six).
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Figure 9: A histogram showing the distribution of convergence times generated
by 1000 trials with N = 6 players, R = 3 resources, homogenous payoff functions
and random undirected weighted graphs. Convergence occurred within every
instance.
6 Modeling Wireless Networks
The spectrum sharing problem has an intrinsic spatial element, because the mu-
tual interferences generated among users on the same channel heavily depends
on the locations of the corresponding transmitters and receivers. The GCGWE
allows us to use “weights” to reflect how much interference one user may cause
to an other user. By selecting edge weights appropriately, we can account for
the spatial aspects of spectrum sharing in an accurate way. This is very useful
because the spatial aspect of spectrum sharing is less understood than many
other aspects ( [Weiss, Al-Tamaimi and Cui(2010)]). In this section we shall de-
scribe how the GCGWE can be used to model spectrum sharing, in accordance
with the physical interference model (e.g., [Goussevskaia et al. (2008)]). And
then we shall use the GCGWE to simulate spectrum sharing.
Many game theoretic models have been used to study spectrum sharing
(e.g., [Etkin et al. (2007), Wu et al. (2009), Huang et al. (2006a), Huang et
al. (2006b)]), but these generally assume that the users have complete knowl-
edge about the network parameters and each other’s information. Congestion
game based models have the advantage of modeling network scenarios where
the users have limited information, which is the case in many networks (cogni-
tive radio networks in particular). In [Tekin et al. (2012)] and [Southwell and
Huang(2011)], we considered how congestion games on undirected, unweighted
graphs could be used to model spectrum sharing (with players representing
wireless users and resources representing channels). Using an undirected un-
weighted graph to represent interference relationships in this way corresponds
to the protocol interference model in [Gupta and Kumar(2000)], within which
a pair of users are either considered linked (in which case they can cause one
another some fixed amount of interference) or not linked (in which case they
are considered to be too distant to interfere with one another).
Graphical congestion games serves as more realistic models for spectrum
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Figure 10: The relative frequency of fast convergence, for GCGWEs with R = 3
resources, and heterogenous payoff functions. The x-axis shows the number of
players. The y-axis shows the fraction of 1000 trials which converge to pure Nash
equilibria within ten time slots. The blue circular points were generated using
GCGWEs on random undirected weighted graphs, the red triangular points
were generated using GCGWEs on random directed weighted graphs.
sharing than classical congestion games, because they have player-specific pay-
off functions and allow for spectrum reuse (where distantly spaced individuals
can use the same channel without mutual interference). However, the protocol
inference model does not fully capture the real interference relationships be-
tween the users. In reality, inference level depends on transmission power levels
and decreases continuously with separation distance. Interference effects can
be captured much more accurately using the signal-to-noise ratio (SINR) model
(e.g., [Goussevskaia et al. (2008)]). Our models in this paper are powerful
enough to incorporate the SINR-based physical interference model, and thus
are generalizations of the models introduced in [Tekin et al. (2012)].
6.1 Modeling Physical Interference Model with Fixed Trans-
mission Power
Consider a wireless network where each user is a fixed transmitter-receiver pair.
We model the interference by the physical interference model, where the in-
terference received by a user is the summation of the power received from all
other users in the network. The maximum achievable transmission rate (ac-
cording to the Shannon capacity) that a user n gets by using channel r is
Br log2 (1 + SINR), where Br is the bandwidth of channel r and SINR is the
signal-to-interference plus noise ratio,
SINR =
hn,nPn
τ0Bi +
∑
m:m6=n,Xm=r hm,nPm
.
Here τ0 is the thermal noise density, Pm is the transmission power of m’s trans-
mitter, and hm,n is the channel gain from m’s transmitter to n’s receiver.
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Figure 11: The relative frequency of fast convergence, for GCGWEs with N = 6
players, and heterogenous payoff functions. The x-axis shows the number of re-
sources. The y-axis shows the fraction of 1000 trials which converge to pure
Nash equilibria within ten time slots. The blue circular points were gener-
ated using GCGWEs on random undirected weighted graphs, the red triangular
points were generated using GCGWEs on random directed weighted graphs.
If each user has a fixed transmission power (which is the default operation
mode in today’s Wi-Fi networks), then the spectrum sharing scenario can be
modeled as a GCGWE (N ,R, (Rn)n∈N , (frn)n∈N ,r∈Rn , S), where each player
n ∈ N corresponds to a fixed transmitter-receiver pair. Each resource r ∈ R
corresponds to an orthogonal channel. When channels have an equal bandwidth
(which is true in Wi-Fi , WiMax, and LTE networks) and the channels are
interleaved (and thus have the same channel conditions for the same user), the
system corresponds to a GCGWE with homogenous resources. Each user n has
a user-dependent available channel set Rn ⊆ R. This flexibility is especially
useful for modeling cognitive radio networks, where the channels available to a
secondary user depend on the activities of the licensed users within its vicinity.
Each player uses exactly one resource/channel at a given time, due to limitation
of the hardware. Sm,n measures the amount of interference that m causes
n when both users are on the same channel. More precisely, Sn,n = 0 and
Sm,n = hm,nPm for n 6= m. Player n’s payoff of using resource r depends on
the interference level x =
∑
m:Xm=Xn
Sm,n, and is equal to
frn(x) = Br log2
(
1 +
hn,nPn
τ0Br + x
)
. (1)
When the power levels of the users are equal, and distinct transmitter-
receiver pairs are distantly spaced (relative to the distance between individual
transmitters and their receivers), the assumption that the interference relation-
ship between users is symmetric (i.e., hn,m = hm,n) is at least approximately
valid. Such cases correspond to GCGWEs with symmetric spatial matrices, or
“on undirected graphs”.
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6.2 More General Modeling of Wireless Networks
The GCGWE can model much more general wireless communication problems
than the one described above. In particular, the models can include:
• User-specific transmission technologies: Users may have different payoffs
and different channel preferences because of different transmission tech-
nologies. We can choose player-specific payoff functions (instead of the
same Shannon capacity) to model this.
• User-priorities: We can also use edge weights to reflect different user
priorities in cognitive radio networks. For example, if n is a primary license
holder and m is an secondary unlicensed user, then we could set Sn,m to
be very large to reflect the price that m must pay (or the punishment
which m may receive) for causing interference to the license holder n.
Based on the analytic results shown in Section 4, we can prescribe whether
selfish user behaviors in wireless networks can lead to mutually acceptable and
stable system state, based on its network topology and payoff functions.
6.3 Simulating wireless networks
The fact that GCGWEs are general enough to emulate the SNIR model gives us
the valuable opportunity to study a realistic model of spectrum sharing. In this
section, we will simulate spectrum sharing in wireless networks using GCGWEs.
In particular, we will investigate how N = 20 selfish radio users (scattered across
a square region of length L) will share R = 5 homogenous channels. We study
how the users’ ability to share the spectrum is influenced by L. We suppose
that each player corresponds to a fixed transmitter-receiver pair that wishes to
maximize its transmission rate by selecting the best channel, in the same way
as we described in Section 6.1. We shall also make the following assumptions:
• Each of user n transmits at a fixed power level of Pn = 100 mW.
• Each channel r has a bandwidth of Br = 20 MHz, and is available to every
user.
• The payoff that a user n gets for using a channel Xn = r is equal to its
transmission rate, as given by Equation (1).
• We shall use the distance-based physical interference model ( [Goussevskaia
et al. (2008)]), by writing the channel gain hm,n, from user m’s transmit-
ter to n’s receiver (see Equation (1)) as hm,n = 1/d
α
m,n, where α is the
attenuation factor and dm,n is the distance from m’s transmitter to n’s
receiver.
• We will suppose that the attenuation factor α = 4 and the spectral noise
density τ0 = −174 dBm /Hz = 10−17.4 mW /Hz.
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• We place each transmitter at a point (chosen uniformly at random) from
our L × L square. Each receiver is uniformly randomly located within
100 m of its transmitter. We insure that no receiver is with 1 m of a
transmitter (since our distance based SINR model breaks down at such
close ranges).
For each simulation run, we randomly generate a network and randomly
allocate one of the five channels to each user. Then the network evolves under
random better response updates (as described in Section 5) until a pure Nash
equilibrium has been reached (or some pre-specified large number of time slots
have elapsed). We show the choices of channels in a pure Nash equilibrium of a
network under our parameters in Fig. 12.
Figure 12: A pure Nash equilibrium in a network where the N = 20 users
are scattered across a square of length L = 200 m. Each arrow points from
a transmitter (represented by a black router) to its receiver (represented by a
gray computer). The link colors represent the channels that users choose at this
pure Nash equilibrium. The average transmission rate of users at this pure Nash
equilibrium is 101 Mbps. Notice how links (users) of the same color naturally
spread out to avoid strong mutual interferences.
The majority of our simulation runs converged to pure Nash equilibria. As
Fig. 13 shows, however, convergence time is highly variable in simulation runs.
Figure 13 shows that 20 users normally reach a pure Nash equilibrium within
200 time slots. In rare cases, however, it can take over 1000 time slots for a
simulation to converge. In this regard, we re-encounter the problem we saw in
Section 5: sometimes a system will never converge, and sometimes it will take a
very long time to converge. Also, unlike in Section 5, each of these systems has
520 states. This make it impractical to rigorously verify whether a given system
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Figure 13: The x-axis gives the length L (in meters) of the square region
which the users are scattered over. We performed 10 simulations for each
L ∈ {50 m, 100 m, ..., 500 m}. We ran each simulation for up to 2000 time slots.
The y-axis shows how many time slots it takes a given simulation to converge.
We do not show the points corresponding to simulations which did not converge.
Note that the scale of the y axis is logarithmic.
has the finite improvement property or pure Nash equilibria.
For this reason, we studied how the relative frequency that a given system
will converge within 500 time slots, depends upon the geometry of the network.
Figure 14 shows that it is easier for the users to organize themselves into a
pure Nash equilibrium when the area they are spread across is larger. This
effect agrees with our findings from section 4.2. When the users are scattered
across a large area, the distance between distinct transmitter-receiver pairs will
often be much larger than the distance between a particular transmitter and
its receiver. This will cause the interference relationship between the users
to be approximately symmetric (in that the distance from n’s transmitter to
m’s receiver will be approximately equal to the distance from m’s transmitter
to n’s receiver). This means the system will (approximately) correspond to
a GCGWE with homogenous resources and a symmetric spatial matrix. In
this case, Theorem 6 states that the system will have the finite improvement
property, and therefor will eventually converge to a pure Nash equilibrium.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce the graphical congestion game with weighted edges
(GCGWE), which is a general model for studying how selfish and spatially
distributed individuals will share resources. Although we use spectrum sharing
to illustrate the effectiveness of GCGWE, such a model can really be used in
many different network scenarios. By identifying which GCGWEs possess pure
Nash equilibria and the finite improvement property, we gain insight into when
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Figure 14: The x-axis gives the length L, in meters, of the square region which
the users are scattered across. We performed 1000 simulations for each value of
L. The y-axis gives the fraction of these simulations which converged to a pure
Nash equilibrium within 500 time slots.
spatially distributed wireless nodes will be able to self organize into a mutually
acceptable resource allocation. We also consider the efficiency of the pure Nash
equilibria, and the computational complexity of finding them.
Our results and simulations suggest that the topology of the network is more
important than the forms of the payoff functions, with respect to the ability of
the players to self organize to pure Nash equilibria. One of our key results, The-
orem 6, states that any GCGWE with symmetric congestion relationships and
homogenous resources has the finite improvement property. In addition to our
observations about the positive effects of symmetric congestion relationships, we
have also observed the negative effects of asymmetric congestion relationships.
In particular, we found that GCGWEs on directed graphs with no pure Nash
equilibria can easily be constructed, and simulations reveal that some GCGWEs
on random directed graphs never (or took a very long time to) converge to a
pure Nash equilibrium under better response updates.
The fact that convergence properties are so sensitive to the qualitative fea-
tures of the network the game is played on, validates our approach, because
it implies that an accurate model of the spatial relationships between players
(such as the GCGWE, as opposed to the standard “congestion game on an un-
weighted undirected graph”) is necessary in order to predict the behaviour of
spatially distributed, resource sharing individuals. In the future, we shall con-
sider GCGWEs where players can use multiple resources simultaneously. We
shall also attempt a finer characterization of which GCGWEs do not have pure
Nash equilibria.
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8 Appendix
In this section we give full proofs to some of the results that we only mentioned
“proof sketches” of in the main paper.
8.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The result clearly holds for any 1 player GCGWE. We will prove by induction.
Suppose every game on a quasi-tree with N vertices has a Nash equilibrium.
Now suppose ψ is a GCGWE on a quasi-tree T with N + 1 vertices. Now T
can be constructed by taking a quasi-tree T ′, on N vertices, and then adding
a vertex N + 1 together with a (one or two-way) link to some vertex n of T ′.
Let us consider the game, restricted to the N vertices of T ′. Now, since this is
a GCGWE on an N vertex quasi-tree, it has a Nash equilibrium X. Now let
us add the vertex N + 1, and join it with vertex n in the appropriate manner.
Now lets update vertex N + 1 to employ its best response r. In other words, we
shall let N + 1 use the resource r that maximizes its payoff, given the resource
Xn used by its new neighbor n.
There are two possibilities following this. The first possibility is that vertex
n remains satisfied (i.e., Xn is still n’s best response) after its new neighbor
N + 1 is added. In this case the state on T is a Nash equilibrium of the new
game ψ. The second possibility is that Xn is no longer vertex n’s best response
after the new vertex N+1 has been added, playing r. In this case we must have
Xn = r. Now in this case, lets consider the modified game, restricted to the
vertices {1, 2, ..., N} of T , where vertex n’s payoff function frn, for using resource
r, is replaced with the payoff function grn such that g
r
n(x) = f
r
n(x + SN+1,n),
∀x. Note that the payoff functions associated with all other players/resources
within this modified game are the same as those within ψ. Now this modified
game (which, we consider to be played upon T ′, whilst temporally ignoring
vertex N + 1) is another GCGWE on an N vertex quasi-tree. It follows (by
assumption) that this modified game has a Nash equilibrium. Now suppose
we allocate strategies to the vertices of T ′ in accordance with such a Nash
equilibrium Y . Let Ym denote the resource allocated to player m ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}
within this Nash equilibrium of the modified game upon T ′. Now let us define
the state Z of game ψ such that Zm = Ym, ∀m ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} and ZN+1 = r.
To see that Z is a Nash equilibrium of ψ note that there are two possibilities.
• The first possibility is that Zn = ZN+1 = r. In this case each player in
{1, 2, ..., N}, including n, is playing the best responses to their surround-
ings. Also, when N + 1 was previously added to the game, we found that
N + 1’s best response was r, even though N + 1’s only neighbor was play-
ing r. In state Z we also have that N + 1 is using the same resource, r,
as its neighbor n. It follows that N + 1 is playing its best response in the
configuration Z. This implies that Z is a Nash equilibrium.
• The second possibility is that Zn 6= ZN+1 = r. Now in this case each
player in {1, 2, ..., N}, including n, is playing the best responses to their
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surroundings. Also, when N + 1 was previously added to the game, we
found that N+1’s best response was r, even though N+1’s only neighbor
was playing r, and N + 1 was suffering congestion from n. In state Z,
player N + 1 is using resource r, but now it does not suffer any congestion
from its neighbor n for doing so. It follows that N + 1 is playing its best
response in the configuration Z. This implies that Z a Nash equilibrium.
So we have shown that the game ψ, on the N + 1 vertex quasi-tree has a Nash
equilibrium. Now our argument implies that if every GCGWE on an N vertex
quasi-tree has a Nash equilibrium then every game on an N+1 vertex quasi-tree
has a Nash equilibrium. This completes the induction proof. 
8.2 Proof of Theorem 2
The key observation is that every directed acyclic graph can be given a topo-
logical sort [Kahn(1962)]. A topological sort is an ordering of the vertices,
such that if i < j then there is no directed edge from the jth vertex to the
ith vertex in the ordering. Intuitively, a topological sort is a way to arrange
the vertices of a directed acyclic graph in a line, so that every directed edge
“points towards the right”. The best response of a player n, in state X, is the
strategy r ∈ Rn which maximizes n’s payoff, given the strategies of the other
players m within X. Consider a GCGWE on a directed acyclic graph D(S)
with adjacency matrix S. Suppose we select some topological sort of D(S). Let
k(u) ∈ N denote the uth vertex/player which appears in the topological sort
of D(S). Now we can construct a Nash equilibrium of the GCGWE by having
players sequentially update their strategies according to their best responses in
the order of k(1), k(2), k(3), · · · . In other words, player k(1) updates to its best
response, then player k(2) updates to its best response, so on and so forth, until
all players have been updated. This will lead to a Nash equilibrium, because
player k(j)’s best response update will not affect players k(i) with i < j, who
have already updated. In other words, no player will ever regret their decision,
because players updated subsequently will have no influence upon them. 
8.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Suppose we have a GCGWE with resource set R = {1, 2} and a symmetric
spatial matrix S. For each player n ∈ N , we can define a parameter Tn, which
corresponds to the maximal amount of congestion that player n can tolerate
from neighbors using resource 2, before it prefers to change to resource 1.
• If f1n(x) < f2n
((∑N
m=1 Sm,n
)
− x
)
for all x ∈
[
0,
∑N
m=1 Sm,n
]
, then Tn =
1 +
∑N
m=1 Sm,n. In this case n will always prefer resource 2 to resource 1,
no matter how congested resource 2 is.
• If f1n(x) > f2n
((∑N
m=1 Sm,n
)
− x
)
for all x ∈
[
0,
∑N
m=1 Sm,n
]
, then Tn =
−1. In this case n will always prefer resource 1 to resource 2, even if
resource 2 is not congested.
29
• Otherwise there must be a unique x∗ in
[
0,
∑N
m=1 Sm,n
]
such that f1n(x
∗) =
f2n
((∑N
m=1 Sm,n
)
− x∗
)
(since each frn is continuous and decreasing). In
this case Tn =
(∑N
m=1 Sm,n
)
− x∗.
The rest of the proof is based on constructing a potential function, which
is a mapping from each state to a real number and decreases with each better
response update.5 This implies that it is impossible for the system to visit the
same state more than once. Since the total number of states is finite, this implies
that every sufficiently long sequence of better response updates reaches a state
from which no further better response updates can be performed. Such a state
is a Nash equilibrium by definition.
Next we define the potential V as a function for any state X,
V (X) =
1
2
(
N∑
m=1
N∑
m′=1
Sm′,m(Xm − 1)(Xm′ − 1)
)
−
N∑
m=1
Tm(Xm − 1). (2)
We will show that V decreases with each better response update.
We begin by defining
A(X) =
1
2
(
N∑
m=1
N∑
m′=1
Sm′,m(Xm − 1)(Xm′ − 1)
)
(3)
and
B(X) =
N∑
m=1
Tm(Xm − 1). (4)
Clearly V (X) = A(X)−B(X). Now we will show that
A(X) =
1
2
∑
m 6=n
∑
m′ 6=n
Sm′,m(Xm − 1)(Xm′ − 1)
+(Xn−1)
∑
m 6=n
Sn,m(Xm − 1)
 .
(5)
To see (5), first note that we can expand out the right hand side of (3) to obtain
A(X) =
1
2
∑
m 6=n
∑
m′ 6=n
Sm′,m(Xm − 1)(Xm′ − 1)
+ Sn,m(Xm − 1)(Xn − 1)

+
1
2
∑
m′ 6=n
Sm′,n(Xn − 1)(Xm′ − 1)
+ Sn,n(Xn − 1)(Xn − 1).
(6)
5The usual definition of potential function requires the function to increase with the best
response update. Here we just inverse the sign and construct a function that monotonically
decreases instead.
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We can further use the fact Sn,n = 0 to rewrite (6) as
A(X) =
1
2
∑
m 6=n
∑
m′ 6=n
Sm′,m(Xm − 1)(Xm′ − 1)
+ 1
2
∑
m 6=n
Sn,m(Xm − 1)(Xn − 1)

+
1
2
∑
m′ 6=n
Sm′,n(Xn − 1)(Xm′ − 1)
 .
(7)
Now by changing the dummy variable in the third part of the right hand side
of (7) from m′ to m, we obtain
A(X) =
1
2
∑
m 6=n
∑
m′ 6=n
Sm′,m(Xm − 1)(Xm′ − 1)
+ 1
2
∑
m 6=n
Sn,m(Xm − 1)(Xn − 1)

+
1
2
∑
m 6=n
Sm,n(Xn − 1)(Xm − 1)
 .
(8)
Since Sm,n = Sn,m holds on an undirected graph, we can simplify (8) to obtain
(5).
Suppose that our game moves from state X to state Y because a player n
performs a better response update. We will now show that
V (Y ) = V (X) + (Yn −Xn)
((
N∑
m=1
Sm,n(Xm − 1)
)
− Tn
)
. (9)
To see this, firstly note that in a similar way of deriving (5) we can obtain
A(Y ) =
1
2
∑
m 6=n
∑
m′ 6=n
Sm′,m(Ym − 1)(Ym′ − 1)
+(Yn−1)
∑
m 6=n
Sn,m(Ym − 1)
 .
(10)
Now, since m 6= n implies Ym = Xm, we can rewrite (10) as
A(Y ) =
1
2
∑
m 6=n
∑
m′ 6=n
Sm′,m(Xm − 1)(Xm′ − 1)
+(Yn−1)
∑
m 6=n
Sn,m(Xm − 1)
 .
(11)
Now subtracting (5) from (11) yields
A(Y )−A(X) = (Yn−1)
∑
m6=n
Sn,m(Xm − 1)
−(Xn−1)
∑
m 6=n
Sn,m(Xm − 1)
 .
(12)
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We can rearrange (12) to obtain
A(Y ) = A(X) + (Yn −Xn)
∑
m 6=n
Sn,m(Xm − 1)
 . (13)
Also note that
B(Y ) =
N∑
m=1
Tm(Ym−1) =
(
N∑
m=1
Tm(Xm − 1)
)
+Tn(Yn−Xn) = B(X)+Tn(Yn−Xn),
(14)
where the last equation of (14) is obtained by substituting (4). Now subtracting
(14) from (13) yields
V (Y ) = A(Y )−B(Y )
= A(X) + (Yn −Xn)
∑
m 6=n
Sn,m(Xm − 1)
−B(X)− Tn(Yn −Xn)
= V (X) + (Yn −Xn)
∑
m6=n
Sn,m(Xm − 1)
− Tn
 .
(15)
Since Sm,m = 0 and Sn,m = Sn,m, we have∑
m6=n
Sn,m(Xm − 1) =
N∑
m=1
Sm,n(Xm − 1). (16)
Finally we can substitute (16) into (15) to obtain (9), as required.
Next we will show that V (Y ) < V (X). Since state Y comes from state X
after having player n perform a better response update, there are two possibil-
ities:
(a) Xn = 1, Yn = 2, and f
2
n
(∑
m:Xm=2
Sm,n
)
> f1n
(∑
m:Xm=1
Sm,n
)
; or
(b) Xn = 2, Yn = 1, and f
2
n
(∑
m:Xm=2
Sm,n
)
< f1n
(∑
m:Xm=1
Sm,n
)
.
Under case (a), we have (Yn−Xn) > 0 and
∑
m:Xm=2
Sm,n =
∑N
m=1 Sm,n(Xm−
1) < Tn, thus based on (9) we have V (Y ) < V (X). Under case (b), we have
(Yn−Xn) < 0 and
∑
m:Xm=2
Sm,n =
∑N
m=1 Sm,n(Xm− 1) > Tn, thus based on
(9) we have V (Y ) < V (X). This completes the proof. 
8.4 A Lemma for the Proof of Theorem 6
Let us define the total congestion level of a state X to be the sum of the
congestion levels of all players, i.e., C(X) =
∑N
n=1
∑
m:Xn=Xm
Sm,n . Lemma
8 states that C(X) decreases every time a player performs a better response
update.
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Lemma 8 Suppose we have a GCGWE with homogenous resources and a sym-
metric spatial matrix S, that starts in state X. Now suppose that some player
performs a better response update, and this converts the game state to Y . We
have C(Y ) < C(X).
Proof: Let’s use cn(X) =
∑
m:Xm=Xn
Sm,n to denote the congestion level of
a player n when the system is in a state X. Suppose the system is in state X,
and then player n performs a better response update, by changing his resource
choice from Xn to r. Suppose Y is the state that results from this update.
Since this update is a better response, Theorem 4 implies
cn(Y ) =
∑
m∈N :Xm=r
Sm,n <
∑
m∈N :Xm=Xn
Sm,n = cn(X). (17)
Clearly n’s congestion level decreases by cn(X)− cn(Y ) as a result of his better
response update.
Next we show that the sum of the congestion levels of n’s neighbors also
decreases by cn(X) − cn(Y ) as a result of n’s better response update. Since
C(Z) =
∑N
n=1
∑
m:Zm=Zn
Sm,n =
∑N
n=1 cn(Z), then we must have C(X) −
C(Y ) = 2(cn(X) − cn(Y )) > 0 (including the congestion level decrease of
player n and his neighbors).
The proof relies on the following three statements for a generic player m 6= n.
1. If a player m does not use either resource Xn or resource r in state X,
then his congestion level will not change in state state Y .
2. If player m uses resource Xm = Xn in state X, then cm(Y ) = cm(X) −
Sn,m = cm(X) − Sm,n. This is due to the fact that n chooses a different
resource r in state Y and no longer congests with m. Thus the conges-
tion level of m is reduced by Sn,m (which is equal to Sm,n because S is
symmetric).
3. If player m uses resource Xm = r in state X, then cm(Y ) = cm(X) +
Sn,m = cm(X) + Sm,n. The is due to the fact that n starts to congest
with m in state Y .
Statement 1 implies ∑
m:Xm /∈{Xn,r}
cm(Y ) =
∑
m:Xm /∈{Xn,r}
cm(X). (18)
Statement 2 implies
∑
m6=n:Xm=Xn
cm(Y ) =
 ∑
m 6=n:Xm=Xn
cm(X)
− ∑
m:Xm=Xn
Sm,n. (19)
Statement 3 implies∑
m:Xm=r
cm(Y ) =
( ∑
m:Xm=r
cm(X)
)
+
∑
m:Xm=r
Sm,n. (20)
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Substituting the expression cn(X) =
∑
m:Xm=Xn
Sm,n into (19) yields
∑
m 6=n:Xm=Xn
cm(Y ) =
 ∑
m6=n:Xm=Xn
cm(X)
− cn(X) (21)
Substituting the expression cn(Y ) =
∑
m:Xm=r
Sm,n into (20) yields
∑
m:Xm=r
cm(Y ) =
( ∑
m:Xm=r
cm(X)
)
+ cn(Y ). (22)
Also, obviously
cn(Y ) = cn(X)− cn(X) + cn(Y ) (23)
Now we can write
C(Y ) =
∑
m∈N
cm(Y ) = cn(Y )+
 ∑
m:Xm /∈{Xn,r}
cm(Y )
+
 ∑
m 6=n:Xm=Xn
cm(Y )
+( ∑
m:Xm=r
cm(Y )
)
(24)
Now by using (23), (18), (21) and (22) to substitute the respective terms on the
right hand side of (24), we obtain
C(Y ) =cn(X)− cn(X) + cn(Y ) +
 ∑
m6=n:Xm=Xn
cm(X)
+
 ∑
m6=n:Xm=Xn
cm(X)
− cn(X)
+
( ∑
m:Xm=r
cm(X)
)
+ cn(Y )
(25)
Next note that
C(X) =
∑
m∈N
cm(X) = cn(X)+
 ∑
m:Xm /∈{Xn,r}
cm(X)
+
 ∑
m 6=n:Xm=Xn
cm(X)
+( ∑
m:Xm=r
cm(X)
)
(26)
Now we can use (26) to simplify (25) and obtain
C(Y ) = C(X) + 2(cn(Y )− cn(X)) (27)
Using (27) together with the fact that cn(X) > cn(Y ) gives us that C(X) >
C(Y ) as required. 
This lemma also has an important corollary.
Corollary 9 If X is the state of a GCGWE with homogenous resources (played
upon an undirected graph) that minimizes the total amount of congestion C(X),
then X will be a Nash equilibrium.
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Proof: We shall prove this result by contradiction. Suppose that X is the
state of our game which minimizes the total amount of congestion, and that X
is not a Nash equilibrium. In this case, some better response can be performed
from X, which moves the system into a different state, Y . However, Lemma
8 implies that C(Y ) < C(X), which contradicts our assumption that state X
minimizes C. 
8.5 Proof of Theorem 7
A problem H is said to be NP hard, if there is an NP complete problem L which
can be solved in polynomial time given an oracle machine O for H. Such an
oracle machine O is capable of solving any instance of H in polynomial time.
Let L denote the problem of determining if some graph G can be given a
proper coloring using three colors. A proper coloring of a undirected graph G
is an assignment of colors to the vertices of G such that no two vertices with
the same color are linked. L is known to be NP complete ( [Blum (1987)]).
Let H denote the problem of finding the Nash equilibrium of a GCGWE, on an
undirected graph with homogenous resources, which maximizes the total payoff
of the players. Now we will show that, given an oracle machine O for H, we
can solve L in polynomial time. We will demonstrate this by showing that,
for any undirected simple graph G, we can construct a GCGWE g on G (with
homogenous resources) which has the following two properties:
• If G can be given a proper coloring with three colors, then every pure
Nash equilibrium X of g that maximizes the total payoff of the players
corresponds to a proper coloring of G (in the sense that no two linked
players are given the same resource under X).
• If G can not be given a proper coloring with three colors, then every pure
Nash equilibrium X of g which maximizes the total payoff of the players
does not correspond to a proper coloring of G (in the sense that there
exists some pair of linked players which are given the same resource under
X).
Suppose we have an instance of L. In other words, suppose that we have a
simple graph G = (V,E), and we wish to determine whether it can be given a
proper coloring using three colors. Let A be the adjacency matrix for the graph
G. Now consider the GCGWE g = (N ,R, (Rn)n∈N , (frn)n∈N ,r∈Rn , S), with a
set of players N = V , a set of three resources R = {1, 2, 3} = R1 = · · · = RN
available to each player, a spatial matrix S = A equal to the adjacency matrix
of our graph, and payoff functions such that frn(x) = −x, ∀n ∈ N , ∀r ∈ R,∀x.
The GCGWE g has three homogenous resources, and is played on the undirected
graph G.
Now (by assumption) our oracle machine O can find a Nash equilibrium X
of the GCGWE g which maximizes the total payoff to the players, in polynomial
time. Now Corollary 9 in Appendix 8.4 implies that X is one of the states of g
which minimizes the total congestion levels of the players in game g.
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Now ifG can be given a proper coloring using only three colors, then the Nash
equilibrium X will clearly involve no congestion (because, it will be possible to
allocate resources to the players in g in such that two players n and m are given
the same resource only if Sn,m = An,m = 0). Conversely, if G cannot be given
a proper coloring using only three colors, then it is inevitable that some pair of
players will cause each other some congestion in any state X of g. Hence, given
X (which we can determine in polynomial time, using our oracle machine O)
we can solve our instance of problem L in order n2 time by checking whether
any pair of linked players n,m ∈ N are using the same resource. If we find a
pair of linked players using the same resource, then the answer to our instance
of L is “no” (i.e., G cannot be given a proper coloring using only three colors),
otherwise the answer is “yes” (i.e., G can be given a proper coloring using only
three colors).
It follows that, if we have an oracle O, for H, then we have a polynomial
time algorithm for solving L (i.e., L is polynomial time reducible to H). Now
since L is NP complete, we have that H is NP hard. 
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